[**PLEASE SEE BELOW FOR A CORRECTION**]
This edition of the show features Adam Boileau and Patrick Gray discussing the week’s security news:
- The DPRK indictment and subsequent fall out
- British Airways gets owned
- Webauthn hits some roadblocks
- The latest action from Washington DC
- Trend Micro has a bad time
- Tesla pays out for key-fob clone attack
- Tor browser 0day hits Twitter
- Much, much more
We’ve got a great sponsor interview for you this week – we’ll be joined by Haroon Meer of Thinkst Canary. They did something unusual over the last couple of weeks – they removed a feature in their Canary product. We’ll be talking about that, and also about the tendency for security software to be too complicated and configurable.
The original release of this podcast included discussion of some rumours that turned out to amount to nothing. We had mentioned three data points:
- The CISO of American Airlines, Dan Glass, departing a few weeks ago
- Someone I know had their AA/Citi credit card re-issued, despite saying they only ever used that card to buy AA fares
- A rumour an FBI computer crime investigator is on site at American Airlines
Well, it turns out Dan Glass is a listener, and he got in touch with us after the podcast ran to clear this up. He says the reason he left is actually because AA was offering some very attractive redundancy packages. Following AA’s merger with US Airways the combined group eventually found itself in the position of having too many executives. As many listeners will know, being a CISO is a pretty hardcore job so Dan jumped at the chance to bounce out and have some time off.
As for the FBI being on-site, Dan says that’s not unusual. They’re one of the largest airlines in the world so they’re frequently liaising with LE. As for my pal’s card getting re-issued… who knows?
The point is it looks like these rumours and data points don’t actually add up to much. This is why I rarely run rumour in the podcast and at least try to do some verification. In this case I just didn’t have time, but still, I just should have just held it over until I’d had a chance to make some basic enquiries. It was sloppy. Sorry.
In particular I’d like to apologise to the fraud teams who may have been asked to follow this up, the PR teams who’ve no doubt been fielding questions about this and also to Dan Glass. Although, it must be said Dan and I had a very nice chat and he didn’t seem upset. Thanks for being a chiller, Dan!
Again, I’m sorry. I’ll do better in the future.